The empty set of course contains no computable point. On the other hand, surprising results due to Zaslavskiĭ, Tseĭtin, Kreisel, and Lacombe have asserted the existence of non-empty co-r. e. closed sets devoid of computable points: sets which are even “large” in the sense of positive Lebesgue measure.This leads us to investigate for various classes of computable real subsets whether they always contain a computable point.

We study the computational content of the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem in the Weihrauch lattice. Connected choice is the operation that finds a point in a non-empty connected closed set given by negative information. One of our main results is that for any fixed dimension the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem of that dimension is computably equivalent to connected choice of the Euclidean unit cube of the same dimension. Another main result is that connected choice is complete for dimension greater than (...) or equal to two in the sense that it is computably equivalent to Weak Kőnig’s Lemma. While we can present two independent proofs for dimension three and upward that are either based on a simple geometric construction or a combinatorial argument, the proof for dimension two is based on a more involved inverse limit construction. The connected choice operation in dimension one is known to be equivalent to the Intermediate Value Theorem; we prove that this problem is not idempotent in contrast to the case of dimension two and upward. We also prove that Lipschitz continuity with Lipschitz constants strictly larger than one does not simplify finding fixed points. Finally, we prove that finding a connectedness component of a closed subset of the Euclidean unit cube of any dimension greater than or equal to one is equivalent to Weak Kőnig’s Lemma. In order to describe these results, we introduce a representation of closed subsets of the unit cube by trees of rational complexes. (shrink)

Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game‐theoretic results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e., the existence of a winning strategy in games that involve two players and two outcomes saying who wins. In a multi‐outcome setting, the notion of winning strategy is irrelevant yet usually replaced faithfully with the notion of (pure) Nash equilibrium. This article shows that every determinacy result over an (...) arbitrary game structure, e.g., a tree, is transferable into existence of multi‐outcome (pure) Nash equilibrium over the same game structure. The equilibrium‐transfer theorem requires cardinal or order‐theoretic conditions on the strategy sets and the preferences, respectively, whereas counter‐examples show that every requirement is relevant, albeit possibly improvable. When the outcomes are finitely many, the proof provides an algorithm computing a Nash equilibrium without significant complexity loss compared to the two‐outcome case. As examples of application, this article generalises Borel determinacy, positional determinacy of parity games, and finite‐memory determinacy of Muller games. (shrink)